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INTRODUCTION 
Considerable controversy was generated in the United States by the 
introduction into the Senate in May 2011 of the Protect IP Act (PIPA)1 and 
by the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA)2 which was introduced into the 
House of Representatives in October 2011. Both pieces of legislation sought 
to facilitate the capacity of the IP enforcement authorities in the U.S. to 
combat the online trade in pirated copyright works and counterfeit 
trademarked goods. Provisions included court orders to take down websites 
which made infringing products available and payment facilities from 
conducting business with infringing websites, search engines from linking 
to the sites, and court orders requiring Internet service providers to block 
access to the sites. Existing criminal laws were to be extended to penalise 
the unauthorized streaming of copyrighted content.  
Characterizing SOPA and PIPA as attempts to introduce censorship of 
the Internet, notable companies such as “Tumblr, Mozilla, Techdirt, and the 
Center for Democracy and Technology were among many Internet 
companies who protested by participating in ‘American Censorship Day’ on 
November 16, 2011.”3 They displayed black banners over their site logos 
with the words “STOP CENSORSHIP.”4  
  
 1. Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual 
Property Act, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter PIPA] (referencing the Senate bill, 
which may also be cited as “Protect IP Act of 2011”). 
 2. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter SOPA].  
 3. Protests Against SOPA and PIPA, WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protests_against_SOPA_and_PIPA (last visited June 10, 2012) 
(providing a comprehensive account of the protests referenced). 
 4. Id.  
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On January 18, 2012, Wikipedia’s English language site and an 
estimated 7,000 other smaller websites coordinated a service blackout to 
raise awareness.5 Over 160 million people viewed Wikipedia’s banner.6 
“Other protests against SOPA and PIPA included petition drives, with 
Google stating that it had collected over seven million signatures, as well as 
boycotts of companies and organizations that supported the legislation.”7 
Paradoxically, in a protest about censorship, the web sites of organizations 
that were considered supporters of the legislation, such as the United States 
Justice Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Universal Music 
Group, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), and the 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) were slowed or shut down 
with denial of service attacks.8 
On January 18, 2012, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid announced that 
a vote on PIPA would be postponed until the issues raised about the bill 
were resolved, and on January 20, 2012, House Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Lamar Smith announced that the Committee would postpone 
consideration of SOPA until there was wider agreement.9 Although lauded 
as a triumph for the Internet community, the apparent demise of SOPA and 
PIPA was paralleled by the covert triumph of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA), was described on Internet blogs as being “SOPA’s 
Pimp Daddy,”10 as “SOPA and PIPA on Steroids,”11 and as being “more 
dangerous than SOPA”12 and “worse than SOPA.”13  
ACTA was adopted by the negotiating parties, including the U.S., on 
April 15, 2011.14 On  October 1, 2011, a special signing ceremony was held 
in Tokyo, with the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, Morocco, New 
  
 5. Stop Online Piracy Act, WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stop_Online_Piracy_Act (Last visited June 10, 2012). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Molly Wood, Anonymous Goes Nuclear; Everybody Loses?, CNET NEWS 
(Jan. 19, 2012, 5:40 PM PST), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31322_3-57362437-
256/anonymous-goes-nuclear-everybody-loses/. 
 9. Jonathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves Antipiracy 
Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/ 
technology/senate-postpones-piracy-vote.html.  
 10. “Acta” is SOPA’s Pimp Daddy, THE POLITICAL FILM BLOG (Jun. 10, 2012), 
http://politicalfilm.wordpress.com/2012/01/24/acta-is-sopas-pimp-daddy/.  
 11. Anomaly, Meet ACTA; It’s SOPA and PIPA on Steroids, the Global Edition, 
FREAKOUTNATION (Jun. 10, 2012), http://freakoutnation.com/2012/01/22/meet-acta-its-sopa-
and-pipa-on-steroids-the-global-edition/.  
 12. Lance Ulanoff, ACTA ‘Is More Dangerous Than SOPA,’ MASHABLE SOCIAL 
MEDIA (Jun. 10, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/01/26/acta-more-dangerous-than-sopa/.  
 13. Erik Kain, If You Thought SOPA Was Bad, Just Wait Until You Meet ACTA, 
FORBES (Jun. 10, 2012), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2012/01/23/if-
you-thought-sopa-was-bad-just-wait-until-you-meet-acta/.  
 14. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) (Opening for Signature), (May 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2011/5/0501_01.html.  
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Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea all signing ACTA.15 This article 
explores how ACTA was negotiated without the scale of the protests which 
accompanied SOPA and PIPA. 
I. THE ROAD TO ACTA- FAILURE OF ENFORCEMENT NEGOTIATIONS IN 
OTHER FORA 
The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade Related 
aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) had originated 
as a response to the frustration which principally the U.S. and the European 
Union (EU) shared about the inadequacy of the international intellectual 
property rights IPR regime to deal with the growth of counterfeiting and 
piracy.16 The proposal made by the United States that IPR regulation be 
shifted to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), made at the 
launch of the Uruguay Round in 1987,17 was created because of its 
disillusionment with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
as an effective custodian of the international IPR system.18 The creation of 
the World Trade Organization as the body responsible for the administration 
of the GATT and the TRIPS Agreement, suggested that IPR enforcement 
would be placed on sound footing.19 However, within ten years of the 
commencement of the TRIPS Agreement, a more than ten-fold increase in 
counterfeiting and piracy from $20 billion annually to at least $450 billion,20 
together with 
the difficulties that the [United States] had in raising the enforcement issue 
in the TRIPS Council, as well as the fairly poor result which it obtained in 
its complaint about the enforcement of China’s copyright law, meant that 
  
 15. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, available at http://www.ustr.gov/acta.  
 16. See generally MICHAEL BLAKENEY, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (1996) (providing, within 
chapter 2, background regarding the origin of the TRIPS Agreement). 
 17. See generally Information: The Uruguay Round: Decisions of 28 January 1987 
(Feb. 5, 1987), GATT/1405 (1987). 
 18. See generally William N. Walker, A Program to Combat International 
Commercial Counterfeiting, 70 TRADEMARK REP. 117 (1980). 
 19. See generally THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-
1992) (Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1993) (providing a comprehensive account of the negotiating 
history of the Uruguay Round). 
 20. It should be noted that there is a significant lack of agreement about the size of 
the annual trade in infringing products. See World Intellectual Prop. Org., Advisory Comm. 
on Enforcement, Dec. 1 – 2, 2010, The Economic Effects of Counterfeiting and Piracy: A 
Literature Review, 6th Sess., Dec. 1-2, 2010, ¶ 49, WIPO Doc. WIPO/ACE/6/7 (Sept. 3, 
2010); See World Intellectual Prop. Org., Advisory Comm. on Enforcement, Dec. 1 – 2, 
2010, Observations on Efforts to Quantify the Economic Effects of Counterfeit and Pirated 
Goods, 6th Sess., Dec. 1-2, 2010, ¶ 1, WIPO Doc.WIPO/ACE/6/4 (Sept. 3, 2010). 
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the WTO was not the effective forum which the [United States] had 
[sought].21  
In June 2005, the EU sought to initiate discussions on IPR enforcement.22 
At the TRIPS Council meeting in June 2006, it called for an “in-depth 
discussion” of enforcement issues.23 This proposal was met with strong 
opposition from leading developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, 
China, and India, which considered the enforcement issue a diversion from 
the Doha Development Agenda.24 At the TRIPS Council meeting in October 
2006, the EU, with support from Japan, Switzerland, and the U.S., 
submitted a joint communication asserting that the TRIPS Council was “an 
appropriate forum to examine and assist Members in the implementation of 
enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement” and that the work of the 
TRIPS Council “should complement Members’ efforts to use other 
cooperative mechanisms to address IPR enforcement.” 25 The co-sponsors 
stated that they: 
-  Invite other Members to engage in a constructive discussion of how to 
implement the enforcement provisions of TRIPS in a more effective 
manner.  
- Invite other Members to engage in a constructive discussion of 
accompanying measures which could enhance the effectiveness of national 
implementing legislation and enforcement efforts, such as for example 
promoting interagency co-operation, fostering a higher public awareness, 
and reinforcing institutional frameworks.  
- Ask the Secretariat to prepare a synopsis of Members’ contributions to 
the Checklist of Issues on Enforcement that would serve as a basis for the 
above-mentioned discussion.  
  
 21. Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26 2009) (interpretation of Article 61 was 
raised in China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights, which arose on a complaint by the U.S. about the enforcement of China’s 
copyright law).  
 22. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Enforcement 
of Intellectual Property Rights: Communication from the European Communities, 
IP/C/W/448 (June 9, 2005). 
 23. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Enforcing 
Intellectual Property Rights: Border Measures: Communication from the European 
Communities, IP/C/W/471 (June 9, 2006). 
 24. Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, ‘EU Gets Little Support for Enforcement Proposal at 
WTO; CBD Issue Unresolved’, IP-WATCH (June 16, 2006, 2:52 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2006/01/25/ustr-clarifies-demand-for-details-on-chinas-ipr-enforcement-
cases/. 
 25. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Enforcement 
of Intellectual Property Rights: Joint Communication from the European Communities, 
Japan, Switzerland and the United States, ¶ 4, IP/C/W/485 (Nov. 2, 2006). 
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- Stand ready, in cooperation with recipients of technical assistance and 
with relevant international organizations, to better focus the technical 
assistance they provide in favour of developing countries in order to 
facilitate the implementation of enforcement provisions.26  
A number of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) objected to this 
proposal on procedural grounds and it was rejected.27 The LDCs apparently 
interpreted the joint communication as an “implied threat that countries 
failing to provide ‘adequate’ protection of intellectual property rights 
ultimately could be found not to be in compliance with TRIPS.”28 Taking a 
more capacity-building approach, the U.S., at the next TRIPS Council 
meeting in January 2007, circulated a paper sharing its experience on border 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, and called on the TRIPS Council 
to “make a positive contribution to addressing [IPR enforcement] problems 
through a constructive exchange of views and experiences.”29 Although the 
LDCs found this approach to be procedurally acceptable, they reiterated that 
the issue of enforcement did not belong in the TRIPS Council.30 China, with 
the support of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, India, and South Africa, declared 
that “enforcement could not be a permanent agenda item in the council.”31 
In June 2007, Switzerland introduced a paper suggesting ways to implement 
the enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and to improve the 
overall enforcement of IPRs, particularly in the area of border measures.32 
Finally, on October 11, 2007, Japan introduced a paper on border 
enforcement of IPRs that outlined the recent trend on IPR infringements.33 
Less than two weeks later, on October 23, 2007, each of these countries 
  
 26. Id. ¶ 7.  
 27. See Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, ‘WTO TRIPS Council Stumbles over Inclusion of 
Enforcement’, IP-WATCH (Oct. 27, 2006, 12:23 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2006/10/27/wto-trips-council-stumbles-over-inclusion-of-enforcement/.  
 28. See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
369, 383-86 (2006).  
 29. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Communication from the United States: Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (Part III 
of the TRIPS Agreement): Experiences of Border Enforcement, IP/C/W/488 (Jan. 30, 2007). 
 30. Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, TRIPS Meeting: Boost to IP Issues as Part of Resumed 
Trade Talks, US Submits Enforcement Proposal, IP-WATCH (Feb. 14, 2007, 11:54 AM), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/2007/02/14/trips-meeting-boost-to-ip-issues-as-part-of-resumed-
trade-talks-us-submits-enforcement-proposal/.  
 31. Id. 
 32. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Communication from Switzerland: Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: 
Communication and Coordination as a Key to Effective Border Measures, IP/C/W/492 (May 
31, 2007). 
 33. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Communication from Japan, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, IP/C/W/501 (Oct. 
11, 2007). 
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joined in the announcement of commencement of the ACTA negotiations.34 
Although, as we will see below, the proponents of ACTA would be 
criticised for ignoring multilateral fora such as the WTO and WIPO in their 
efforts to establish ACTA, they unsuccessfully attempted to initiate 
discussions on IPR enforcement in the TRIPS Council. Thus, Peter K. Yu 
points out that as “these countries have claimed, the unwillingness of less-
developed countries to discuss enforcement issues gave them no choice but 
to explore discussions in another forum.”35 
Interestingly, after the ACTA negotiations were well under way and it 
seemed that an agreement was likely to be forthcoming, the issue of IPR 
enforcement was again placed on the TRIPS Council’s agenda, but this time 
on the initiative of China and India. At a meeting of the TRIPS Council in 
June 2010, the representative from China expressed concern “about the 
TRIPS-plus enforcement trend” embodied in ACTA, which might cause at 
least the following problems: 
First were potential legal conflicts and unpredictability. Though TRIPS 
required only minimum standards of IP protection and allowed Members 
to implement in their laws more extensive protection, it also provided 
certain conditions for applying such extensive protection. First, such 
protection should “not contravene the provisions” of TRIPS. Secondly, it 
required Members to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce 
intellectual property rights did not themselves become barriers to 
legitimate trade. Thirdly, these extensive protections should not 
inappropriately restrict the inbuilt flexibilities and exceptions in the TRIPS 
Agreement. Fourthly, according to the chapeau of Article 20 of GATT 
1994, if applied as border measures, they should not violate other covered 
agreements under the WTO and not be applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination among 
Members or a disguised restriction on international trade, and only 
measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations could 
be applied, which was the so-called necessity test. 36 
The Chinese delegate expressed her country’s concern that ACTA would 
break the delicate balance “between the three pillars of GATT, GATS and 
TRIPS . . . between developed and developing countries, rights and 
obligations, technology innovation and transfer and dissemination of 
  
 34. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Ambassador 
Schwab Announces U.S. Will Seek New Trade Agreement to Fight Fakes (Oct. 23, 2007), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/ambassador-schwab-announces-us-will-seek-new-trade-
agreement-fight-fakes. 
 35. Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA 64 SMU L. REV. 975, 
993 (2011) [hereinafter Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA]. 
 36. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Minutes of 
Meeting: Held in the Centre William Rappard on 8-9 June 2010, ¶ 252, IP/C/M/63, (Oct. 4, 
2011) (hereinafter Minutes of Meeting: Held in the Centre William Rappard on 8-9 June 
2010). 
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technology, the advantage of producers and interests of users of technology 
. . . . [and between] economic welfare and social welfare including public 
health and nutrition.”37 She noted the “imbalance of interests between the 
developed and developing world in IP protection caused by the digital 
divide and the impact of TRIPs-plus enforcement on the allocation of public 
resources in developing countries.”38 She concluded that IPR infringement 
“was largely a problem during the process of development. Therefore, 
development was the crux of the matter.”39  
The representative from India supported China’s statement that the high 
levels of protection envisaged in ACTA were likely to disturb the balance of 
rights and obligations in the TRIPS Agreement and could restrain TRIPS 
flexibilities.40 He suggested that the released ACTA text “showed a general 
shift in the focus of enforcement which enhanced the power of IP holders 
beyond reasonable measure . . . shifting the enforcement forum towards 
customs administrative authorities and away from civil courts.”41 The U.S. 
representative said that the notion that TRIPS-plus enforcement standards 
were somehow a trend “was a problematic one and was misplaced” “[as] 
every national IP enforcement regime . . . was TRIPS-plus- “in the sense 
that national implementing measures for IP enforcement were necessary to 
address numerous procedural and substantive issues for which there was no 
TRIPS requirement.”42 He mentioned the attempts of the U.S., together with 
the EU, Japan, and Switzerland, to support a dialogue in the Council for 
TRIPS on the implementation of the existing enforcement obligations under 
the TRIPS Agreement, and to identify solutions to implementation 
deficiencies. However, he noted “through the course of past meetings of the 
Council, that Members of the WTO had widely divergent views on the 
nature of the enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and even, 
regrettably, on the appropriateness of discussing those provisions in the 
Council,” and that “members should not be surprised to see the concerned 
Members seeking to combat this threat elsewhere.”43  
Among the other ACTA negotiators, the representative of Korea referred 
to the right of WTO Members under Article 1.1 of TRIPS to implement in 
their domestic law more extensive protection than was required by the 
Agreement and that the public text of ACTA, stating that “[n]othing in this 
Agreement shall derogate from any international obligation of a Party with 
respect to any other Party under existing agreements to which both Parties 
  
 37. Id. ¶ 255. 
 38. Id. ¶¶ 255-58. 
 39. Id. ¶ 262. 
 40. Id. ¶¶ 264, 270. 
 41. Id. ¶ 271. 
 42. Id. ¶ 279. 
 43. Minutes of Meeting: Held in the Centre William Rappard on 8-9 June 2010, 
supra note 36, ¶ 282. 
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are party” and that “there was nothing more than this to clarify the concerns 
raised.”44 A similar point was made by the Japanese representative, who 
added that discussion on enforcement practices “should be conducted in a 
fact-based and analytical manner taking into account concrete situations and 
the types of measures to be considered.”45 The representative of Canada 
pointed out that “effective enforcement of IPRs was a fundamental aspect of 
the TRIPS Agreement that was not only a matter of establishing procedural 
remedies, but also of improving cooperation, capacity building and 
communication” and that “the objective of ACTA was not to undermine the 
TRIPS Agreement but to complement it by focusing on improving aspects 
of enforcement, including legal procedures, cooperation and 
communication, that the Council for TRIPS had so far been prevented from 
considering.”46 The representative of Australia also referred to the previous 
difficulty in discussing enforcement within the Council for TRIPS and 
explained that “[s]tandards in ACTA were largely built upon those 
negotiated within the WTO, and reflected the TRIPS consistent measures 
already in place in many WTO Member countries.”47 The Swiss 
representative also explained that the ACTA initiative was being undertaken 
because “thus far, attempts to even only discuss issues relating to the 
growing problem of counterfeiting and piracy in an open and constructive 
spirit in multilateral forums such as the Council for TRIPS had met with 
absolute rejection by some delegations, including China and India “[and that 
it]“considered its participation in the ACTA negotiations “as additional to 
its commitment and efforts at the multilateral level, particularly the WTO 
and WIPO.”48 The representative of New Zealand explained its participation 
in ACTA because it believed that ACTA would be an important, effective to 
combat the “increasingly prolific trade in counterfeit and pirated goods, 
through better enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, 
including through international co-operation.”49 Finally, the representative 
from the EU explained that with the tenfold increase of counterfeiting and 
piracy fifteen years after the commencement of the TRIPS Agreement,  
[H]e failed to understand why Members who rightly enjoyed the 
flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement had to prevent other Members 
from also enjoying the flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement to tackle a 
growing problem, the consequences of which in terms of risks for safety 
and health, and in terms of criminal organizations, were even worse in 
  
 44. Id. ¶ 287. 
 45. Id. ¶¶ 294-95. 
 46. Id. ¶¶ 301-02. 
 47. Id. ¶ 303. 
 48. Id. ¶¶ 314-15. 
 49. Minutes of Meeting: Held in the Centre William Rappard on 8-9 June 2010, 
supra note 36, ¶ 323. 
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developing countries that had less means, and were more exposed to traffic 
of spurious medicines.50 
Of the major developing countries, the representative of Brazil said his 
country “had always taken the position that enforcement was essentially a 
matter of domestic policy making and priority setting that had no place on 
the agenda of the Council . . . [and] preferred that the sharing of national 
experiences on enforcement . . . at WIPO’s Advisory Committee on 
Enforcement that had been specifically designed for that purpose.”51 In 
addition to supporting the concern of China and India about the impact of 
ACTA upon the delicate balance of TRIPS, he expressed the concern that 
the ACTA negotiating process “lacked the legitimacy of initiatives 
conducted in multilateral organizations” and that it might “end up being 
TRIPS-minus to the extent that it contributed to narrowing down the scope 
for flexibilities.”52 The representative of Nigeria, speaking on behalf of the 
African Group, expressed concern “about the erosion of policy space that 
might curtail Members’ ability to access medicines critical for the African 
continent” but he reported that the African Group was also concerned about 
the issue of counterfeiting and piracy “which had an economic impact in 
Members countries as many industries were closing down.”53  
When the 2 October 2010 of ACTA became available in the public 
domain, the Indian and Indonesian delegations took the opportunity to 
revisit the implications of ACTA for WTO Members at the October 26 -27, 
2010 TRIPS Council meeting.54 The delegate from India noted the broad 
reach of the border measures and that in scaling up the minimum 
enforcement level enshrined in the TRIPS Agreement, through its Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) provisions, ACTA would have a direct impact on 
exports, even of Members which were not involved in ACTA negotiations, 
“contrary to one of the main principles of the WTO rules based system, 
which was to liberalize trade.”55 He alleged that ACTA negotiators “decided 
among themselves to overturn the decision of the WTO dispute settlement 
panel in the recent China-IPRs case by reinterpreting the phrase 
‘commercial scale’ with respect to willful trademark counterfeiting and 
copyright piracy so as to refer to any activity carried out for a direct or 
indirect economic or commercial advantage.”56 He said that ACTA would 
  
 50. Id. ¶ 326. 
 51. Id. ¶ 316. 
 52. Id. ¶¶ 317-18. 
 53. Id. ¶ 319.  
 54. Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Minutes of 
Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard, Oct. 26-27, 2010, ¶ 440, IP/C/M/64, (Feb. 17, 
2011), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?language=1 (hereinafter 
Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard, Oct. 26-27, 2010). 
 55. Id. ¶ 444. 
 56. Id. ¶ 445. 
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substantially increase customs authorities’ ex officio activity in enforcing 
intellectual property rights, limit the protection otherwise available to 
accused infringers under the TRIPS Agreement by potentially lowering 
knowledge thresholds and limiting due process requirements, and expressed 
concern that ACTA would set up “a plurilateral intellectual property 
enforcement body outside the purview of either WIPO or the WTO, which 
might undermine the role of the multilateral organizations.”57 After 
reiterating the arguments about interference with the delicate balance of the 
TRIPS Agreement, he concluded that “to find an effective and enduring 
solution to the problem, Members needed to step back from a purely 
mercantilist approach and needed to avoid exaggerating the issue of 
counterfeiting and piracy in view of the lack of empirical data.”58 The 
representative of Indonesia “urged WTO Members to refrain from 
supporting this TRIPS-plus initiative as it could create a new type of non-
tariff barrier, particularly for developing and least-developed country 
Members.”59  
Among the other major developing countries, the Brazilian 
representative added the concern that ACTA might be converted “into a 
truly international organization dealing with the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, whose impact on WIPO and the WTO, especially on 
capacity building and technical assistance, was unpredictable at this 
stage.”60 The representative of China said that excessive or unreasonably 
high standards for intellectual property protection could unfairly increase 
monopolistic profits of right holders, eating into the consumer surplus and 
further broadening the gap between the rich and the poor in the world. She 
also pointed out that as ACTA did not have any multilateral WTO mandate, 
any negative spill-over effects of ACTA on WTO Members which were not 
party to ACTA would “be subject to review in various WTO councils and 
committees, but also subject to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and 
possible counter measures in accordance with the DSU, the TRIPS 
Agreement, GATT, GATS, and other WTO Agreements.”61 
Of the ACTA signatories, the representative of the U.S. (or United States 
representative?) outlined the provisions which were contained in the final 
draft of the ACTA highlighting the fact that “ACTA would []be the first 
agreement of its kind to promote several key best practices that contributed 
to effective enforcement of intellectual property rights” and he welcomed 
all Members who were interested in enhancing IPR enforcement to consider 
joining the agreement.62 The representative of Japan reiterated that ACTA 
  
 57. Id. ¶ 446. 
 58. Id. ¶¶ 449-50. 
 59. Id. ¶ 454. 
 60. Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard, Oct. 26-27, 2010, supra 
note 54, ¶ 451. 
 61. Id. ¶ 459. 
 62. Id. ¶¶ 460-63. 
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was consistent with WTO obligations and would be implemented in such a 
manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade.63 The 
representative of Canada “said that ACTA was consistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement . . . [A]nd that the objectives and principles of the TRIPS 
Agreement applied mutatis mutandis to ACTA.”64 Nor did ACTA create or 
alter rights relating to the protection of intellectual property rights, but 
rather “it set new standards for the enforcement of existing intellectual 
property rights which were complementary to those provided in the TRIPS 
Agreement.”65 This was supported by Australia.66 The representative of the 
EU claimed “a clear preference for dealing with enforcement within the 
WTO or WIPO” but that this had been frustrated by the refusal of a number 
of WTO Members to engage in any discussion on IP enforcement in the 
TRIPS Council obliging it to pursue such discussions outside this forum67 
The representative of Mexico explained that his country had suffered from 
counterfeiting and piracy in its new economic sectors such as clothing, 
tobacco, medical drugs, music, books etc. and that Mexico was a party to 
ACTA “because it was important to have effective border measures to 
combat counterfeiting and piracy.”68 In a written statement, Singapore 
focused its comments on the “value that [it saw] in participating in the 
ACTA process,” which included “the encourage[ment] of innovation, 
creativity and the growth of industry and commerce” and “strengthening 
cooperation to better protect the interests of consumers and industries 
alike.”69 It saw ACTA as complementing and strengthening the role of the 
multilateral institutions and their processes. 
On October 17, the final text of ACTA was circulated to WTO Members 
at the request of the delegations of Australia, Canada, the European Union, 
Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, and the U.S.70 
II. PLURILATERAL ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) 
PROPOSED 
The idea of establishing a new agreement on IPR enforcement has its 
origins in the Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy, 
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organised for the first time in 2004 by the World Customs Organization 
(“WCO”) in collaboration with Interpol with the participation of a number 
of business organizations, which was concerned with “the rampant theft of 
intellectual property.”71 At the Second Global Congress on Combating 
Counterfeiting and Piracy hosted by Interpol at Lyon in November 2005, 
Japan had proposed a Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Counterfeits and 
Pirated Goods. The twin central features of this proposed treaty were 
proposals for the confiscation of the proceeds of IP crimes and the 
extradition of IP criminals.  
The Treaty also proposed to address a number of matters that had been 
omitted from the border control provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. These 
provisions focus upon the imports of infringing products. It also proposed 
controls over the export and transshipment of counterfeit and pirated goods. 
The Japanese Treaty also proposed the removal of the de minimis exception 
contained in TRIPS of importation for private use. An area of enforcement 
the Treaty addressed was the deterrence of the distribution and sale of 
counterfeit and pirated goods on the Internet. Finally, a dispute settlement 
mechanism was proposed, together with deterrent sanctions. At the end of 
the Congressional session, the participants adopted the Lyon Declaration, 
which recommended the further consideration of “Japan’s proposal for a 
new international treaty.”72 The Japanese Treaty proposal was reiterated at 
the Third and Fourth Global Congresses on Counterfeiting and Piracy in 
Brussels 2006 and Geneva 2007.  
Paralleling the Japanese initiative the U.S. contemplated collaborating 
with its trading partners to develop an international strategy to fight 
counterfeiting and piracy. In 2005, pursuant to its Strategy Targeting 
Intellectual Property (“STOP!”) Initiative, the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR), Susan Schwab, “led interagency teams to meet with 
key trading partners to advocate closer cooperation in fighting piracy and 
counterfeiting, and to advocate sharing of ‘best practices’ for strong legal 
frameworks.”73 “In 2006 the USTR encouraged the interagency Trade 
Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), representing the interests of twenty U.S. 
government agencies, to endorse the concept of a multi-party, ‘TRIPS-plus’ 
ACTA.”74 In explaining the origins of ACTA, in a Freedom on Information 
proceeding, Assistant USTR, Stanford McCoy, explained:  
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USTR proposed that a group of leading IPR-protecting nations could work 
together to set a new standard for IPR enforcement that was better suited 
to contemporary challenges, both in terms of strengthening the relevant 
laws and in terms of strengthening various frameworks for enforcing those 
laws. The interagency TPSC concurred with USTR’s recommendation that 
USTR begin contacting trading partners to join a plurilateral ACTA.75 
From 2006, the U.S. and Japan had begun joint discussions on a new 
multilateral treaty to combat counterfeiting and piracy.76 During 2006 and 
2007 these discussions were extended to include Canada, the EU and 
Switzerland. The Japanese treaty proposal was superseded by the 
announcement on October 23, 2007, by the U.S., EU, Japan, South Korea, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Canada of negotiations for a 
Plurilateral Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). The use of the 
word “plurilateral” was presumably to distinguish ACTA from existing 
multilateral trade agreements, such as TRIPS and the various bilateral free 
trade agreements negotiated between various trading partners subsequent to 
the establishment of the WTO and the regional free trade agreements such 
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the trade 
agreements of the EU; specifically, U.S. announcement stated that the 
“ACTA will not involve any changes to the TRIPS Agreement, rather, the 
goal is to set a new, higher benchmark for enforcement that countries can 
join on a voluntary basis.”77 
 The European Commission indicated that it would use the ACTA “to 
create a new layer of intellectual property protections because it mandates 
from EU Member States to negotiate the ACTA with a list of specific 
countries, including the U.S., Japan, Korea, Mexico and New Zealand.78 
One of its aims is described as “[c]reating a strong modern legal framework 
which reflects the changing nature of intellectual property theft in the global 
economy . . . .”79 A statement by METI Minister Akira Amari, stated that “it 
is essential to establish a new international framework aimed at 
strengthening the enforcement of intellectual property rights” to deal with 
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“serious and significant threat to the world economy” caused by the 
proliferation of pirate and counterfeit goods. 80 
III. TRANSPARENCY OF THE ACTA NEGOTIATIONS 
In December 2007, before formal negotiations commenced, the USTR 
requested that its negotiating partners agree to be bound by a confidentiality 
agreement it had prepared.81 Subsequently, this was used by the USTR to 
classify all correspondence between ACTA negotiating countries as 
“national security“ information on the grounds that it was confidential 
“foreign government information.”82 Similarly, its negotiating partners 
justified their failure to divulge information about ACTA to their 
confidentiality obligation. Thus for more than two years, no official drafts 
of the treaty were released for public scrutiny and the specific terms under 
discussion in the negotiations were not identified. This lack of information, 
as well as the restricted participation of states in the negotiation of the 
ACTA and the exclusion of public interest groups from the negotiating 
process was the subject of widespread criticism, particularly by civil society 
groups.83 Exacerbating this criticism was the revelation that certain favoured 
bodies were obtaining access to documents.  
In September 2008, the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public 
Knowledge, two U.S. civil society organizations, filed a lawsuit under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requesting the release of records 
concerning ACTA “as a matter of public interest” to acquire documents 
such as “participant lists, agendas, presentations and documents distributed 
at, or received at, meetings of USTR staff with” representatives of the 
entertainment, luxury, and pharmaceutical industries, “agents, 
representatives and officials of international entities dealing with the 
enforcement of intellectual property,” and any other “agency memoranda, 
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briefing notes, and analysis concerning ACTA. “However, the two 
organizations dropped the lawsuit in June 2009 after the Obama 
administration classified the ACTA negotiations a matter of national 
security.”84 
In November 2008, the Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure 
(FFII) applied to the Council of the European Union for access to 
documents concerning ACTA. This request was refused by the Council on 
the ground that “unauthorised disclosure . . . could be disadvantageous to 
the interests of the European Union or of one or more of its Member 
States,” as the negotiations are still in progress and their disclosure “could 
impede the proper conduct of the negotiations.”85  
In September 2009, another U.S. civil society organization, Knowledge 
Ecology International (KEI),86 reported that the USTR was using 
nondisclosure agreements “to selectively share copies of the ACTA Internet 
text outside of the USTR formal advisory board system.”87 On September 
11, 2009, KEI submitted a Freedom of Information request to the 
USTR, asking for the names of persons who had signed these agreements, 
as well as copies of them. On October 9, 2009, it received copies of these 
agreements identifying a total of 32 persons who received the Internet 
texts.88 These included representatives from: the Business Software Alliance 
(3), eBay (4), Google (3), News Corporation (2), a law firm, Wilmer Hale 
(2), Intel (2) Dell, Verizon, Sony Pictures Entertainment, Time Warner, 
Consumer Electronics Association (2), the International Intellectual 
Property Alliance (IIPI), and four persons from two civil society 
organizations: Public Knowledge (3) and the Centre for Democracy and 
Technology. The USTR also informed KEI that seven persons received the 
ACTA Internet text as members of the Industry Trade Advisory Committees 
on Intellectual Property Rights (ITAC 15),89 as well as three persons from 
  
 84. Emily Ayoob, Note, Recent Development: The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 175, 188 (2010). 
 85. Letter from Ramón Jiménez Fraile, on behalf of the Gen. Secretariat of the 
Council of the European Union, to Ante Wessels (Nov. 5, 2008), available at http:// 
action.ffii.org/acta/Analysis?action=AttachFile&do=get&target=08-1835en.wes.wsjj.pdf. 
 86. KEI was created as an independent legal organization in 2006, assimilating the 
staff and work program of the Consumer Project on Technology (CPTech) to   engage inter 
alia in global public interest advocacy, and to enhance the “transparency of policy making.” 
See KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, http://keionline.org (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
 87. KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, http://keionline.org/node/660 (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2012).  
 88. Id.  
     89.  Id. (including Anissa S. Whitten, Vice President, International Affairs and Trade 
Policy, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc; Eric Smith, President, International 
Intellectual Property Alliance; Neil I. Turkewitz Executive Vice President, International, 
Recording Industry Association of America; Sandra M. Aistars, Assistant General Counsel, 
Intellectual Property, Time Warner Inc.; Stevan D. Mitchell, Vice President, Intellectual 
Property Policy, Entertainment Software Association; Thomas J. Thomson, Executive 
Director, Coalition for Intellectual Property Rights; Timothy P. Trainer , President, Global 
 
102 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 21:1 
the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Information and 
Communications Technologies, Services, and Electronic Commerce (ITAC 
8).90 These are two of a number of committees established by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce and the Office of the USTR to “engage business 
leaders in formulating U.S. trade policy.”91 The role of the business 
community in the formulation of United States IPR trade policy has been 
the subject of extensive analyses in relation to the negotiation of the TRIPS 
Agreement,92 and so it is unexceptional that similar business representatives 
have been involved in contributing to U.S. policy on the formulation of the 
ACTA. As will be seen below, criticism was leveled about the lack of 
transparency by those persons within and outside the U.S. who were denied 
access to negotiating texts. 
Indeed, the official position taken by the negotiating parties until April 
2010 was that draft texts did not exist. Yu suggests that on the basis of the 
history of the way in which the TRIPS Agreement evolved, this may well 
have been the case, as the earlier sessions may have been taken up with 
amassing information.93 In any event, as the USTR noted in its denial of the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation’s request under the Freedom of Information 
Act, ACTA-related documents concerned “information that is properly 
classified in the interest of national security pursuant to Executive Order 
12958.”94 This Executive Order, issued in April 1995, allowed documents to 
be classified as confidential when their unauthorized disclosure “reasonably 
could be expected to result in damage to the national security.”95 It is 
difficult to see how information about an agreement concerned with 
intellectual property enforcement could have national security implications. 
The first intimation of the content of the ACTA was a “Discussion Paper 
on a Possible Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement” which was posted to 
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the Wikileaks website.96 Other sources include the websites of negotiating 
parties which identified the matters under discussion in the ACTA 
negotiations, from which the content of the ACTA could be inferred.97 
Responding to an increasing crescendo of calls for the publication of the 
ACTA, in February 2009 the USTR issued a “Summary of Key Elements 
Under Discussion.”98 The USTR’s Summary stated that “ACTA delegations 
are still discussing various proposals for the different elements that may 
ultimately be included in the agreement. A comprehensive set of proposals 
for the text of the agreement does not yet exist.”99 It provided “an overview 
of the elements suggested under the different headings and highlights the 
main issues.”100 The USTR noted that “discussions are ongoing; new issues 
might come up and other issues may finally not be included in the 
agreement.”101  
Calls for greater transparency were made even by supporters of ACTA. 
For example, Dan Glickman, the CEO of the Motion Picture Association of 
America wrote to Senator Patrick Leahy, chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, and to USTR Ron Kirk, that “outcries on the lack of 
transparency in the ACTA negotiations . . . distract from the substance and 
the ambition of the ACTA which are to work with key trading partners to 
combat piracy and counterfeiting across the global marketplace.”102 In 
March 2010, a fact sheet was published informing on the content and the 
objectives of the agreement.103 It addressed the transparency issue by stating 
that the steps negotiating parties had taken to provide more information to 
the public included: “issuing a summary of the issues under discussion, 
publishing agendas ahead of each negotiating round and issuing press 
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releases shortly after the conclusion of each round.”104 However, the press 
releases did little more than list the participating countries and the subjects 
which were addressed. 
The problem with this lack of transparency was that various versions of 
the alleged ACTA have been made available, causing concern to those who 
consider themselves to be adversely affected. For example, the French civil 
rights organisation La Quadrature du Net, on January 18, 2010, placed a 
fifty-six page consolidated version of the text of an EU stakeholder dialogue 
meeting shortly after its conclusion.105 This version was of particular 
concern to NGOs and organizations concerned with the Internet freedom. 
Probably the most strident calls for transparency were made by 
politicians. Michael Geist lists legislators from Canada, France, Germany, 
New Zealand, Sweden, and the U.S. who called for the ACTA to be made 
public.106 “On January 21, 2010 UK Junior Business Minister David Lammy 
was quoted as saying that he could not put documents about ACTA in the 
House of Commons Library because other countries wanted to maintain 
secrecy.”107 However, on March 17, 2010, he was reported as being in 
favour of placing the draft text in the public domain.108 This change of heart 
was no doubt attributed to a resolution of the European Parliament on 
Transparency and State of Play of the Anti Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
that “[the European] Commission should immediately make all documents 
related to the ongoing international negotiations on the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA) publicly available.”109 The Resolution stated that  
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) will contain a new 
international benchmark for legal frameworks on what is termed 
intellectual property right enforcement. The content as known to the public 
is clearly legislative in character. Further, the Council confirms that ACTA 
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includes civil enforcement and criminal law measures. Since there can not 
be secret objectives regarding legislation in a democracy, the principles 
established in the ECJ Turco case must be upheld.110 
The Turco case concerned a request by Mr. Maurizio Turco, the Italian 
Radical MP and former MEP, to the European Council for access to 
documents appearing on the agenda of a Justice and Home Affairs Council 
meeting, including an opinion of the Council’s legal service on a proposal 
for a directive laying down minimum standards for the reception of 
applicants for asylum in Member States. The Council had refused to 
disclose the legal opinion on the ground that it deserved special protection 
so as not to create uncertainty regarding the legality of the measure adopted 
further to that opinion; the Court of First Instance upheld the Council’s 
refusal111 but the decision was reversed by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ).112 Regarding the fear expressed by the Council that disclosure of an 
opinion of its legal service relating to a legislative proposal could lead to 
doubts as to the lawfulness of the legislative act concerned, the ECJ held 
that it was precisely this openness which contributed to conferring greater 
legitimacy on the institutions in the eyes of European citizens and 
increasing their confidence in them by allowing different points of view to 
be openly debated.  
On April 15, 2010, a number of European Members of Parliament from 
the Green Party wrote to the WIPO Director General, drawing his attention 
to the EU Resolution of March 10, 2010 “showing the growing concern of 
European citizens regarding ACTA” and requesting “an expert assessment 
and analysis of the current provisions of ACTA” from WIPO’s institutional 
viewpoint “as one the two specialised organisations entrusted with the issue 
of norm-setting in the field of intellectual property rights and related 
issues.”113 The letter noted “with disappointment that ACTA has bypassed 
the multilateral WTO and WIPO institutions which have structured and 
practised processes to assure participation, information sharing and 
transparency in international norm-setting negotiations” and it commended 
WIPO’s practices of making negotiating texts available, when distributed to 
all members of the negotiation as well as procedures which allow accredited 
non-governmental organisations to attend meetings and organise side-
events. This was contrasted with the negotiations for the 8th round of ACTA 
being negotiated in New Zealand, which was characterised as “secret from 
the public and consumers, and in defiance of the principles of democratic 
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decision making.”114 The letter then sought answers to a number of 
questions about the negotiation of international IP norms. There is no 
formal record of an answer to this letter, although in a joint statement issued 
by the ACTA negotiating partners it was suggested that “it is accepted 
practice during trade negotiations among sovereign states to not share 
negotiating texts with the public at large, particularly at earlier stages of the 
negotiation.”115  Although the word “trade” appears in the title of the 
ACTA, it is questionable whether the Agreement can properly be 
chracterised as a “trade agreement” given that it is largely concerned with 
IP enforcement and contains no provisions that facilitate or promote trade.116 
In anticipation of the ACTA negotiators’ meeting in Wellington in April 
2010, participants at a “PublicACTA Conference” April 10, 2010 
promulgated the Wellington Declaration for the consideration of the 
negotiators.117 This Declaration appears to have been actuated by concerns 
about possible attacks on Internet freedoms. In relation to transparency, it 
called for full transparency and public scrutiny of the ACTA process 
including release of the text after each round of negotiations.118 
On April 16, 2010, following the 8th round of negotiations, a Joint 
Statement was issued by participants explaining that “negotiations have now 
advanced to a point where making a draft text available to the public will 
help the process of reaching a final agreement” and that “the consolidated 
text coming out of these discussions” would be made available to the public 
on April 21, 2010.119 On that day a “Consolidated Text” prepared for public 
release was made available, described as a “PUBLIC 
Predecisional/Deliberative Draft.”120 Most of the text was in square 
brackets, indicating a lack of agreement on those provisions. In a press 
release, EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht declared that the ACTA 
“will be fully in line with current EU legislation. . . . The agreement will not 
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include provision which modify substantive intellectual property law, create 
new rights or change their duration.”.121 The publication of the consolidated 
text was described as a partial victory for transparency, which would not 
have happened without the agitation of civil society organizations and the 
various leaked documents.122 The victory was described as partial because 
the published text was “decided without any input from consumer 
organisations or ordinary people.”123  
Responding to these concerns, meetings were held between ACTA 
negotiators and civil society representatives at the time of the 9th round of 
negotiations in Lucerne in July 2010 and civil society and business 
representatives at the time of the Tokyo round in October 2010. 
Consolidated texts of ACTA were issued in August, October and November 
2010. The final text was released on December 6, 2010 after a meeting of 
negotiators in Sydney for what they called “legal scrubbing.” It was noted 
that “in fitting form” this final meeting was “performed behind closed 
doors” and that the host Australian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade 
“did not answer press inquiries on the agenda or a list of discussed 
changes.”124  
The negotiation of ACTA by a select group of invited countries, in 
negotiations attended by a lack of transparency will inevitably taint its 
acceptance as an international IP enforcement standard, particularly on the 
part of the uninvited. In an early account of the ACTA a commentator wrote 
that “the activity envisaged by the plan is more usually undertaken by trade 
bodies such as the WTO, the G8 group of industrialised nations and WIPO” 
but that a statement by the European Commission “said that it felt it needed 
more room to maneuver than those bodies provided.”125 It was pointed out 
that the “European Commission wants to create a new layer of intellectual 
property protections because it says that existing structures such as WIPO 
are not flexible enough.”126 As the Director General of WIPO pointed out, at 
the time of the Lucerne round, it is “a bad development for a multilateral 
agency, that member states start to do things outside. Either the machinery 
works, or it doesn’t,” and he concluded that “[I] think [that this] is the real 
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significance of ACTA.”127 He said that the challenge is first, to “make the 
multilateral system relevant” because international problems require an 
international solution, as opposed to a partial one.128 Secondly, the most 
vulnerable countries are the ones that most need the inclusiveness of the 
international system in which all countries have a voice.129 Thirdly, it is bad 
public policy for solutions to happen by default.130 
A study by Jeremy Malcolm of a number of international institutions 
observed that “[e]ven the WTO, the least participatory of the organizations 
studied, posts all of its official documents online, and most of the other 
institutions also make available negotiating texts.”131 He concluded that 
“ACTA meets none of the basic best practices for transparency of the 
existing institutions of the intellectual property policy regime.”132 This study 
was referred to in the submission to the USTR of thirty U.S. legal 
academics cautioning against the acceptance of the Agreement by the 
President as an executive act.133 They pointed out that “ACTA was drafted 
under unusual levels of secrecy for a legislative minimum standards 
agreement.”134 They concluded that the “kind of secrecy envisioned and 
practiced by the USTR needlessly created and fostered an adversarial 
relationship with the public that reinforced the worst fears and criticism 
about international intellectual property lawmaking” and that “[t]his has 
further undermined the legitimacy of the ACTA negotiating process, and 
ACTA itself.”135  
Despite the criticisms about the ACTA negotiating process, concerns 
about the lack of transparency continue. In March 2011, a request under the 
U.S. Freedom of Information Act by the NGO Knowledge Ecology 
International (KEI) to study a Congressional Research Service study of 
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ACTA and its legality that was undertaken for the U.S. Senate and shared 
with the USTR was denied.136 
IV. POST NEGOTIATION DEVELOPMENTS 
ACTA was submitted to the respective authorities in participating 
countries to undertake relevant domestic processes. Article 39 provides for 
ACTA to remain open for signature by participants in its negotiation137 and 
by any other WTO Members the participants may agree to by consensus, 
from March 31, 2011 until March 31, 2013. Article 40 provides that ACTA 
enters into force thirty days after the date of deposit of the sixth instrument 
of ratification, acceptance, or approval. “The Government of Japan will 
receive signatures as the nominated Depositary of the Agreement.”138 
The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) sought 
written comments from the public on the final text of the ACTA in 
connection with consideration of U.S. signature of the agreement, by 
February 15, 2011.139 In response to this request, Public Knowledge urged 
that the USTR should “[s]eek to include, as part of the agreement, an agreed 
statement reflecting the understanding that ACTA would not require 
changes to U.S. law,” that it would “[n]ot coerce non-ACTA countries to 
accede to the agreement” and “employ a more open and inclusive process as 
it negotiates the proposed Transpacific Partnership (TPP) agreement.”140 
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The International Trademark Association (INTA), responding to this 
invitation, in a letter dated February 15 2011, recommended that the ACTA 
Committee, established under the Agreement, “should help other countries 
develop assessments of the economic, social and other benefits of 
participating in ACTA or at a minimum adopting its principles” and that the 
Committee “should also ‘recruit’ other non-signatories to sign and 
implement this agreement.”141  
It had been pointed out that “[t]he US Government has made clear that it 
intends to conclude ACTA as a ‘sole executive agreement,’ meaning that it 
will enter into effect upon the signature of the President or his 
representative, without being formally presented for approval to either 
house of Congress.”142 In a submission to the USTR, thirty U.S. legal 
academics wrote a submission calling “on the Obama administration to 
comply with the Constitution by submitting the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) to Congress for approval” pointing out that “the 
executive branch lacks constitutional authority to enter international 
agreements on intellectual property without congressional consent.”143 A 
Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, held 
between August 25-27, 2011, “convened over 180 experts from 32 countries 
and six continents to “help re-articulate the public interest dimension in 
intellectual property law and policy.”144 It issued the Washington-
Declaration on Intellectual Property and Public Interest which made a plea 
for reasonableness and proportionality of legal penalties, processes, and 
remedies to the acts of infringement they target and to preserve the right of 
countries to “retain the rights to implement flexibilities to enforcement 
measures and to make independent decisions about the prioritization of law 
enforcement resources to promote public interests.”145 The Declaration was 
a response to the passage of ACTA. 
On November 24, 2010 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on 
ACTA, which stressed, inter alia, that any agreement reached by the EU on 
ACTA must comply fully with the acquis communautaire and noted that as 
a result of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the 
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Parliament will have to give consent to the ACTA text prior to the 
agreement’s entry into force in the EU. In November 2010, the Policy 
Department of the EC’s Directorate-General for External Policies issued the 
terms of reference for an external Study on ACTA to “provide a concise and 
comprehensive overview” of the Agreement and to “respond to certain key 
questions which have been raised by the MEPs during the negotiation of the 
agreement.”146 In February 2011, an Opinion was issued by a group of 
European academics on ACTA which claimed that certain ACTA 
provisions were not entirely compatible with EU law particularly in relation 
to criminal enforcement.147 In response to the criticisms made in the 
Opinion in March 2011, the European Commission held a meeting with 
representatives of non-governmental organisations, as part of its DG Trade 
Civil Society Dialogue.148 At this meeting the Commission rejected the 
Academics Opinion stating that no legislative changes would be required as 
ACTA went no further than the existing EU enforcement rules. On April 27, 
2011, the European Commission released a Working Paper in which it took 
issue with this Opinion.149 In June 2011, the Study which the Policy 
Department of the EC’s Directorate-General for External Policies had 
commissioned on ACTA was published.150 The primary recommendation of 
the assessment was that “unconditional consent would be an inappropriate 
response from the European Parliament . . . .”151 It proposed that if the 
European Parliament decided to give its consent “this should be conditional 
on the inclusion of statements that provide interpretation and guidance on 
how member states should apply ACTA in a way that complies with EU 
member states international obligations.”152 It found that “the letter of the 
agreement is not incompatible with the Acquis but that there are no 
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guarantees that its implementation will be.”153 Consequently, it was 
recommended that the European Parliament “may therefore wish to consider 
a need for a clarification of and guidance on how ACTA will be 
implemented especially the border and criminal enforcement measures as 
well as the in-transit procedures.”154  
On June 28, 2011, the European Commission circulated a Proposal for a 
Council Decision on the conclusion of the ACTA with the country parties to 
the negotiation.155 At the request of the Greens/European Free Alliance 
group in the European Parliament an Opinion was prepared on whether the 
final version of ACTA and its foreseen legislative procedure was in line 
with the European Convention on Human Rights and/or the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.156 This opinion concluded that the current draft of 
ACTA “seriously threatens fundamental rights in the EU and in other 
countries, at various levels.”157 Specifically, it asserted that “an explicit de 
minimis rule and an explicit public interest defence are the minimum that 
are required” to bring the criminal enforcement provisions into conformity 
with the European Convention and Charter.158 The overall assessment was 
that. 
ACTA tilts the balance of IPR protection manifestly unfairly towards one 
group of beneficiaries of the right to property, IP right holders, and 
unfairly against others. It equally disproportionately interferes with a range 
of other fundamental rights, and provides or allows for the determination 
of such rights in procedures that fail to allow for the taking into account of 
the different, competing interests, but rather, stack all the weight at one 
end.159 
In September 2011, the Committee on International Trade (INTA) of the 
European Parliament filed a request to its Legal Services to advise on the 
compliance of ACTA with the EU acquis.  
Mindful of the controversy generated by the ACTA negotiations on 
February 22, 2012, the European Commission announced that it would seek 
an advisory opinion from the European Court of Justice before moving 
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forward with the ratification of the ACTA. This was explained as a means 
of easing the concerns of European citizens about whether the agreement 
could lead to censorship.160 A reflection of this concern was a petition 
received on February 28, 2012 by the European Parliament signed by more 
than 2.4 million Internet users against ACTA.  
Australia and New Zealand reported that their respective parliamentary 
committees would be scrutinizing ACTA before action is taken.161 On 
October 16, 2010, the Australian Minister for Trade commended the 
Agreement, stating that the Government would make a final decision on 
ratifying the ACTA treaty after it was examined by the Joint Standing 
Committee on Treaties.162 This examination does not yet appear to have 
taken place, but in March 2011 the Australian Government released the 
Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising The Bar) Bill 2011, which 
proposed to make a number of significant amendments to the major 
Australian industrial property statutes.163 In addition, the Bill contained a 
suite of measures for enhancing trademark and copyright enforcement, 
including measures for the confiscation of counterfeit and pirate goods in 
line with ACTA. The Bill was introduced into the Senate on June 22, 2011.  
On January 31 and February 7, 2011 the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Canadian Heritage held hearings to determine the status of 
negotiations on the free trade agreement with the EU and to find out the 
position of Canada’s negotiators in talks to sign ACTA. The Minister of 
International Trade reported that the Copyright Modernization Bill had been 
introduced to the Canadian Parliament to support Canada’s obligations 
under ACTA. The Standing Committee called on the Government of 
Canada to ensure that Canada’s commitments to the implementation of 
ACTA “are limited to the agreement’s focus on combating international 
counterfeiting and commercial piracy efforts; and that the Government of 
Canada retains the right to maintain domestic copyright policies that have 
been developed within the framework of its commitments to the World 
Intellectual Property Organization and the Berne Convention.”164 
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ACTA has had a chequered history in Mexico. A Working Group of the 
Senate conducted hearings which resulted in a resolution of the Senate on 
September 28,2010, requesting that the President stop the process of 
negotiations for Mexico to sign the agreement.165 This was largely based on 
objections to the lack of transparency in the negotiating process.166 After 
publication of the final version of the ACTA, the Working Group again 
recommended rejection of ACTA by Mexico.167 A resolution of the Senate 
in July 2011 requested the President not to proceed with signature of 
ACTA.168  
In Switzerland, it was reported in September 2011 that “the internal 
process preparing the decision for signature is ongoing” and that “[t]here is 
no timeline . . . .”169  
To some extent, the implementation of ACTA by a number of signatory 
countries is being overshadowed by their participation in the negotiations 
for the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement. This is being negotiated 
between Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, 
the U.S., and Vietnam. President Obama set the APEC summit in November 
2011 as the target for the settlement of negotiations. This Agreement is 
described by some commentators as the “Son of ACTA”170 or as 
“everything the U.S. wanted in ACTA but didn’t get.”171  
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